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Fabienne Gouverneur

The Fodor-Fulbright Correspondence, Congress, and Public Diplomacy 1952-53

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Author's adress and affiliation:

Fabienne Gouverneur

Doktorandin / Andrassy Universität Budapest

E-Mail: fabienne.gouverneur@gmail.com

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1. Introduction*

The longest-serving Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, James William Fulbright (Chairmanship 1959-1974), unquestionably played a major role in the U. S. Congress for many years. With that posited, this paper does not need to prove the influence that Fulbright undoubtedly had on American foreign policy, but will rather investigate an instance of how his own foreign policy choices might have been affected: For 25 years, between 1943 and 1968, Fulbright maintained a correspondence with the (mostly) Berlin-based journalist Mike William Fodor. Their exchange of letters reached its highest frequency in the early 1950s, especially in 1952 and 1953. Concentrating on that time period, this paper will show how Fodor attempted to press the need for a specific kind of US information policy on Fulbright. The paper then tries to answer the question how Fodor's efforts were received by Fulbright and whether or not they may have had an impact on Fulbright and thus Congressional policy.

2. James William Fulbright

Senator James William Fulbright has received ample academic attention before,¹ so for present purposes, it will be sufficient to restate that he entered Congress in 1943, serving as a Representative in the House for one term, then as Democratic Senator for Arkansas from 1945 to 1974. During his time as a Senator, he sponsored the bill creating the exchange program bearing his name and was one of the strongest influences on American foreign policy. After being appointed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, he served as its Chairman from 1959 until the end of his Congressional career in 1975.² These facts are important in order to understand Fulbright's connection to Mike William Fodor, a character much less famed than himself.

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¹ Biographies and analyses of his politics and policies began to be published while he was still in office. Notable works are, among others and in chronological order (and in addition of course to Fulbright's own monographs): Johnson, Haynes, and Gwertzman, Bernard M., *Fulbright: The Dissenter*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday Co., 1968; Tweraser, Kurt, *The Advice and Dissent of Senator Fulbright*. PhD Thesis, International Studies, submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University, June 1971, University of Arkansas Libraries, Special Collections; Tweraser, Kurt, *Changing Patterns of Political Beliefs: The Foreign Policy Operational Codes of J. William Fulbright, 1943-1967*, Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1974; Woods, Randall B., *Fulbright. A Biography*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP, 1995; Powell, Lee Riley, *J. William Fulbright and his Time*, Memphis, TN: Guild Bindery Press, 1996.

² The Fulbright biographies relied upon for this article are: Woods (1995) and Powell (1996) They are the most extensive and recent ones. For a mini biography see, for instance, *Biographical Directory of the United States*

3. Friendship Fulbright - Fodor

Fodor and Fulbright became acquainted and established their friendship in Vienna in 1928. They met in the circle of expatriates and intellectuals frequenting the Vienna coffee houses, notably the Café Louvre, in the late 1920s. Mike Fodor was then a foreign correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* and the *New York Evening Post*³ and, according to various accounts, one of the most knowledgeable and well-informed members of that crowd.⁴ So when Fodor offered to take Fulbright along on one of his trips to the Balkans, the younger American gladly agreed. Passing for a foreign correspondent, he was able to meet many of the great political figures of the day and received a first-hand impression of just how well-connected Fodor was.⁵ The episode of Fulbright's encounter with Fodor is recounted in all of the more extensive Fulbright biographies, along with the explicit acknowledgment of the major influence Fodor had on the young(er) Fulbright.⁶ In spite of that, very little is known about Fodor other than that he was a very active and prolific foreign correspondent at the time, well-respected and liked by his colleagues (many of whom were or would later become more common household names than Fodor himself, such as Dorothy Thompson and John Gunther). Therefore, a biographical outline of Mike Fodor will be helpful at this point.

4. Mike William Fodor

Mike William Fodor was born as Marcel Vilmos Fodor in Budapest, Hungary, in 1890. He grew up in Hungary, pursued his studies in Budapest and Berlin and was a chemical engineer by 1911. He was also interested in the arts and humanities and spent some time in Zurich studying liberal arts. According to his son, Mike Fodor was a typical liberal of the *jeunesse dorée*, a firm, strong-willed pacifist, who would not join the Austro-Hungarian Army upon the outbreak of World War I. Instead, he found work as a chemical engineer in England. It was not long, however, before Fodor, as a Hungarian and thus an 'enemy alien', was interned. Thanks to his father's connections, Mike enjoyed good treatment and it was in this period that he first came into contact with correspondents of the *Manchester Guardian*. After the end of the war, Fodor had to return to Budapest, because his parents

Congress, FULBRIGHT, James William, n.d., <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=fo00401> (last accessed June 15, 2013).

³ cf. Powell, p. 11.

⁴ Johnson & Gwertzman (1968), pp. 30 f.

⁵ Ibid., see also Woods, p. 36.

⁶ Johnson & Gwertzman, pp. 30 f.; Woods, p. 36, and in a personal interview with the author on 01 May 2013; Powell, p. 12; see also Grünzweig, Walter, *Seeing the World as Others See It: J. William Fulbright, International Exchange, and the Quest for Peace*, in: Austrian-American Educational Commission. *Fulbright at Fifty. Austrian-American Educational Exchange 1950-2000*. Wien 2000, 4-13.

had fallen victim to the Béla Kún revolution and it was left to the eldest son to bring the family's affairs in order.⁷ Financially speaking, little was left to be brought in order: the family fortune had been invested and lost. What was left though was the family's network of good connections in Central Europe. During his stay in Budapest, Mike Fodor made contact with the *American Field Service* (AFS), for which Dorothy Thompson was working at the time. The two became friends and she introduced him to work as a journalist when the *Manchester Guardian* offered Fodor a post as its Central European correspondent in Vienna. This is where Fodor met James William Fulbright in 1928, while the young American was on his *grand tour* across Europe after having graduated from Oxford.

Fulbright was impressed by Fodor's knowledge of the region, its languages, and his vast network of influential and well-informed friends and acquaintances. Some Fulbright-biographers maintain that it was Fodor who first roused Fulbright's interest in international affairs.⁸ Be that as it may, the trip as well as his travel partner must have made a lasting impression on Fulbright. Their newly-formed friendship is at the basis of the correspondence that I am analyzing for my dissertation.

In the years covered by the Fodor-Fulbright correspondence, that is between 1943 and 1968, Fodor was initially based in the United States (where he emigrated after the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany. He became a naturalized US citizen during the war). Towards the end of the war and immediately after it, he also traveled a lot to the Balkans, and Greece especially, to cover the civil war (e.g. for the *Chicago Sun*). After that, Fodor was employed by the *Office of Military Government, United States, for Germany* (OMGUS) and became editor-in-chief of the Berlin edition of the American press organ in Germany, *Die Neue Zeitung* (DNZ), in 1948. When publication of DNZ ceased in 1955, Fodor was sent to Munich as policy adviser and program evaluation officer for the local branch of the Voice of America (VOA). Due to his advanced age and illness, he moved back to the United States and then to Europe (Vienna, Paris, Munich) in order to be closer to his son. Mike Fodor passed away in Trostberg near Munich on July 1, 1977.

⁷ Mike's son Denis added, however, that his father had always been vague on that time and his own parents' role in it.

⁸ See Woods, p. 37 and Grünzweig, p. 5.

5. Correspondence

The letters exchanged between Fodor and Fulbright can be found in the J. William Fulbright Papers located at the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville. They date from 08 July 1943 to 19 November 1968. The collection consists of 300 items, of which 183 letters and memoranda were dispatched from Fodor to Fulbright and 76 answers sent to Fodor from Fulbright.⁹ Most of the writing was thus clearly done by Fodor. Usually, he was also the one who would rekindle the dialogue whenever it had been paused for a few months.

The topics discussed between the two reflect the major 'high politics' concerns of the era in European-American relations: they revolve mostly around the Soviet Union, its leaders, policies and intentions. Great importance is given also to the Soviet satellite countries. Overall, especially for Fodor, the most important point is repeatedly to stress how the United States government should act in order to counter Soviet communism. The next major topic is the German situation, the division of the country and of the city of Berlin.

European integration, transatlantic alliance, and German rearmament are topics important to both authors. US domestic affairs play a subordinate role, but are present throughout the correspondence, especially in that part coming from Sen. Fulbright.¹⁰

6. Peak Frequency – 1952-53

The focus of this paper is on one specific period of the correspondence: in 1952 and 1953, the frequency of the letter exchange peaks, with 104 out of the 300 items in the collection written in just those two (out of 25) years. Note that that makes up more than a third of all letters, written in less than a twelfth of the entire time span. Both Fulbright and Fodor individually wrote more letters to the other person than in any other year.¹¹

What made these years so special? A closer look at the letters themselves and what was discussed in them will help to answer that question, assuming one or more particular topic(s) must have been of greater importance than any other topic at any other time.

Among the things that spring to mind, there is the death of Stalin and the question of his succession,

⁹ i.e. 259 letters passed directly between the two of them. The remaining 41 documents are items written by either one concerning the other, thus finding their way into the collection.

¹⁰ A summary overview of the topics that make up the Fodor-Fulbright Correspondence is given in Gouverneur, Fabienne, *Topics of Transatlantic Relations*, publication expected October 2013 in the Conference Proceedings of the VI Annual Convention of Austrian Centers.

¹¹ Fodor wrote 33 and 37 letters and memos in those two years respectively. Fulbright wrote eight and 14 (plus two and ten to other persons concerning Fodor).

which do in fact play a significant role in the correspondence. There is also, very prominently, the question of European integration in the field of defense with the European Defence Community, which both Fulbright and Fodor supported but which never came about.

My argument though is that what brought the two of them closer together in this time period than during any other time of the correspondence was their agreement on and interest in the developments concerning the US information program. This was a time in which both their interests coincided with the presence of a window of opportunity in policy-making: without going into policy analysis theoretically, 1952 and 1953 were (very practically) turbulent times in US Public Diplomacy and especially for the information program (in the following, I will be using the terms „information & propaganda“ as synonymous with „Public Diplomacy“, even if the latter term did not acquire wide usage

until some time later). To recap, early 1952 saw a restructuring of the information program into the International Information Administration (IIA) with Wilson Compton as its first Administrator. Compton was followed, after he resigned just a bit over a year later, by Robert Johnson. That change coincided with the McCarthy investigation into the program and VOA specifically, and the two-year period eventually ended with information in the hands of an all new agency, the United States Information Agency, now independent of the State Department.¹²

What makes this time period particularly interesting is that Fulbright actually played a role in those restructurings, and that Fodor had a stake in them.

So what the Fodor-Fulbright correspondence can add to that story is an unusual perspective on Public Diplomacy in those years. The two authors shared common viewpoints despite the oft-cited tension between Congress and the State Department and despite the very different positions they held: one in Berlin, the European „capital“ of the Cold War, actually involved in running the propaganda and interested in the political day-to-day dimension of it, the other one more removed from these propaganda feuds and interested in its intellectual dimension as well.

The following section will therefore shed some light on the nature of their exchange relating to the subject of US public diplomacy.

¹² Krugler, David F., *The Voice of America and the domestic propaganda battles, 1945-1953*. University of Missouri, 2000, pp. 180-210.

7. Public Diplomacy in the Fodor-Fulbright Correspondence, 1952-53

Communications about the subject of information start out on a positive note.¹³ On January 21, 1952, Fulbright mentions to Fodor that the State Department has just completed the reorganization of its information division and he interprets this as an acknowledgment of the importance of psychological warfare, thus an indication of a possible improvement of the information program: „[...] this reorganization is an effort on the part of the department to emphasize the importance of the psychological warfare. If Compton proves to be a capable man, I have hopes that we can greatly improve our program.“¹⁴ Underlying this is the assumption, shared by both correspondents at that time, that an information program is an important and useful feature in the prevailing Cold War climate.¹⁵

It would be too extensive to quote each and every part of a letter in which US public diplomacy plays a role, in summary it is fair to say that Fulbright's general position is to state changes as they occur or have occurred, often adding his interpretation of or point of view on them. Fodor on the other hand tries explicitly to influence US public diplomacy. He does what he can to promote two things: 1. in general, to promote and change the tone of American counter-propaganda against the much more ubiquitous Soviet propaganda and 2., more specifically, to promote the survival and funding of the newspaper that he is editor-in-chief of, *Die Neue Zeitung*, the American press organ in Berlin. As Jessica Gienow-Hecht has shown, *Die Neue Zeitung* was under virtually constant criticism¹⁶ and its demise began to be imminent in the early 1950s.

Fodor pursued his goals by asking Fulbright explicitly to support the budget for *Die Neue Zeitung* several times.¹⁷ At other times, he presses his point in other ways. For instance, on 14 February 1952¹⁸, Fodor sends Fulbright a letter with two attachments. One is a letter to the editor by a

¹³ In fact, the subject is broached earlier, but so rarely and cursorily that it only reinforces the decision to focus on the years 1952 and 1953.

¹⁴ J. William Fulbright to Mike W. Fodor, 21 January 1952, BCN 105:27. J. William Fulbright Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. All other letters quoted refer to the same repository and collection and will therefore be identified only by their date and book call number (BCN).

¹⁵ Termed the „liberal internationalist“ position by David Krugler in his history of VOA 1945-1953, p. 214 [Five years from then, Fulbright will state a very different view on the subject in one of his Senate floor Speeches (namely that an information approach is warranted in wartime but not constructive to US foreign relations in peacetime), but in 1952 and 53, he concurs with Fodor on the need for US information and propaganda as will be shown in the following.]

¹⁶ Gienow-Hecht, Jessica, *Transmission Impossible*, Louisiana State University Press, 1995.

¹⁷ For instance, there is a letter dated 12 February 1952 in which Fodor writes „It seems [...] that the Department [of State] intends to keep the Berlin Neue Zeitung, provided Congress votes the money for it.“ (BCN 105:27).

¹⁸ BCN 105:27.

German reader of *Die Neue Zeitung*, praising the newspaper in particular and American presence in Germany in general. This, Fodor writes, could be used in the debate on propaganda allocations for Berlin. The second attachment is a nine-page memo outlining virtually all the printed publications in East Berlin and Eastern Germany, including their staff, their financial resources, their distribution and readership. This serves to show just how much effort and money is being invested into propaganda in Moscow and how big the discrepancy is between Soviet and American propaganda efforts, thus accentuating the need for an organ such as *Die Neue Zeitung*.

In his attempt to make his voice (more) heard, Fodor also seeks to utilize his connection to Fulbright in order to gain direct access to Compton, the International Information Administrator.¹⁹ This Fulbright is not able to do though, but vaguely states his intention to „discuss Fodor's situation“ once the expected new legislation concerning information activities comes about.²⁰

In early 1952, both men agree on the need for a more assertive information program coming from the United States. Fulbright states this explicitly (e.g. on Feb 28)²¹, but it can also be inferred from the fact that in 1952 he begins to send most of Fodor's memoranda along to Alan Dulles because he thinks they may be of use to the CIA (same letter, Feb 28).²²

For Fodor, the need for a more assertive information program is a recurring topic, even a plea. He feels overwhelmed by Soviet propaganda, describing the situation of Berlin as that of „an island in the Red Sea“ (April 28, 1953).²³ To him, the danger of Soviet Russia winning the upper hand in the cold war, a war that he essentially perceives as a propaganda war fought for public opinion, presents itself as an imminent possibility (e.g. March 28, 1952).²⁴ He is passionate about his work on the 'front lines' of that cold war and wouldn't leave that position, but is frustrated with his lack of influence in the State Department (April 19, 1952).²⁵ He therefore attempts to use his connection to Fulbright to work around those institutional limitations (such as when he asks Fulbright to get him in touch with Compton).

¹⁹ March 08, 1952. BCN 105:27.

²⁰ March 21, 1952. BCN 105:27.

²¹ BCN 105:27.

²² Fodor asks Fulbright to be discrete in that regard though and not to make explicit the source of the memos, as, being a State Department employee, he is „hampered by restrictions“ (08 March 1952, BCN 105:27).

²³ BCN 105:26.

²⁴ BCN 105:27.

²⁵ BCN 105:27. He would give up his job in Berlin only for another one in Vienna, „another protruded watchtower of ours behind the Iron Curtain“, but only because it would offer him a higher rank within the State Department and thus more influence there.

His understanding of the cold war as a battle for public opinion shows in his letter to Fulbright on July 03, 1952 [note that his English is often somewhat unwieldy, and sometimes faulty. Note also that whenever he uses „we“, „our“, „us“, he refers to the United States]: „I haven't been so pessimistic for a long time as I am at present. We certainly are not doing well anywhere. We are hated in France, disliked [in] England and even the Germans in the West are not too loyal to us. Berlin is the only place where we have 85 percent of the population on our side, and where we are popular. [...] we ought to do a more aggressive propaganda for ourselves, [as we do in Berlin].“²⁶ (And again in a letter of October 16, 1952, in which he denounces the danger of the Soviet „hate America“-campaign that is meant to disunite the US from its Allies.)²⁷

Fulbright reacts to Fodor's strong pleas for a more assertive propaganda by telling him about the Senate subcommittee, headed first by himself and then by Sen. Hickenlooper, whose task it is precisely to investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of American information activities. In this context, Fulbright explicitly asks for Fodor's opinion: „[...] write me your views about the relative value and effectiveness of the various activities we engage in. I would like very much to have your criticisms and suggestions. It is going to be a very difficult job in dealing with intangibles of this character so that any help you can give us will be appreciated.“ (16 July 1952).²⁸

Fodor does not hesitate to comply. On 22 August 1952, he sends a long memo to Fulbright with his key criticisms of the American information program (asking, as he has done before, to have his name kept out of it).²⁹ Those criticisms are twofold and very interesting with regard to actual American information policy. First, he criticizes the strict regulation of information activities by the State Department. Fodor favors a model in which overall control is with the Department, but administrative and financial management is in local hands, i.e. in his case under German law. He finds he doesn't have enough leeway and thinks policy for the information organs should not be made in either DC or New York, but close to the actual activities (i.e. in Germany, for DNZ). His second major criticism is that the American approach designs a propaganda that is too logical – Jessica Gienow-Hecht has termed Americans „reluctant propagandists“ in this context, and Fodor

²⁶ BCN 105:27.

²⁷ BCN 105:27.

²⁸ BCN 105:27.

²⁹ BCN 105:27.

criticizes just that.³⁰ His reasoning is that people behind the iron curtain have been subjected to a propaganda made up of lies for the past five years and that, even if they don't believe what they hear to be true, the permanent repetition of the same falsehoods does have some influence on people.³¹ His view is that the US should continue to spread only the truth, but more aggressively and positively so in order to counter Eastern lies. Interestingly enough though, he does note that, in part, the Soviet propaganda effort is as fruitful as he thinks it is because it is fitted into a high cultural entertainment program, especially in broadcasting. This appealed to the German audience specifically.³² Fodor was most likely also aware of the preference given by German readers and listeners to a style of news reporting that they could at least perceive as neutral and objective.³³ There seems to be a contradiction here between Fodor's acknowledging that the most effective propaganda is that which does not come across as propaganda and his simultaneously expressed wish for a more authoritative, determined US propaganda.

(Not that such a contradiction were not permissible, but the only indication the Fodor-Fulbright correspondence gives for resolving it would be Fodor's great frustration with his hard, dedicated work and the little effect that it is showing either on the receiving end of the propaganda or on the side of those responsible, who won't really listen to him either.)

In any case, we can assume that Fodor's vision of a 'blunt' and massive propaganda no longer corresponds to what Fulbright has in mind when he speaks of setting up „an intelligent program“ (as he does on 03 April 1953).³⁴

Fodor's attitude hardens over time, especially when he is confronted with the possibility that the *Neue Zeitung* might be abolished. Rather than abolishing the only American press organ, he proposes the United States should buy up or help finance more German and other European

³⁰ Transmission Impossible, e.g. p. 5.

³¹ The „Mere Exposure“ effect in psychology indeed suggests this would be the case, but only if initial attitude towards said 'falsehoods' had been neutral or positive. Where it was negative, that attitude would probably have been reinforced.

³² Letter of October 28, 1952, BCN 105:27. Appeal of high culture to German middle class: cf. Gienow-Hecht.

³³ This preference is indicated in a survey conducted by HICOG's Office of Public Affairs, „West Germans Appraise their Present Day Press“, Report No. 159, Series No. 2, October 15, 1952. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State, IIA, IFI/E, Subject Files, 1949-1952, Box 6, Die Neue Zeitung.

³⁴ BCN 105:26.

newspapers and impose conditions for their content, as the Soviets do (Oct 28, 1952).³⁵ At this point, he is clearly not speaking with the voice of the news reporter any more but with that of the Cold War propagandist for the American cause. In his response, Fulbright assures him he will do what he can to keep *Die Neue Zeitung* alive, but remains silent as to the proposal to finance newspapers and expect a particular kind of reporting in return. Omitting the subject was presumably the polite way of expressing what Fulbright would later state explicitly on the Senate floor, when it became known in 1957 that the USIA had paid newspapermen for articles: „To employ persons who are still working for newspapers and influencing the publication of newspapers, strikes me as a rather questionable practice.“³⁶ He elaborates that „Newspapers have a very special protection under the Constitution and under the traditions of our democratic society; [...]. The newspapers create news and mold public opinion. A free press is considered essential to the healthy and lively functioning of a democratic system. [...] it is bad public policy for a Government agency with large amounts of money to spend to be permitted to employ existing employees of newspapers, and to do so on more or less a permanent basis.“³⁷

So while there may be indication of beginning disagreement here, Fulbright and Fodor continue to communicate closely. Fulbright keeps Fodor informed (if not in much detail) on the doings of the Hickenlooper Subcommittee and repeatedly asks to have Fodor's views. In the course of the Subcommittee's work, Fulbright personally travels to Europe to pursue the investigation of the information program there, and meets with Fodor while there (Dec 12, 1952).³⁸ During that meeting, they surely discussed the information situation. Fodor continues to provide Fulbright with his views on the deficiencies of American propaganda, namely that it is not exploiting possibilities to the fullest, such as that of the insufficient supply situation east of the iron curtain, which could be turned into anti-Soviet propaganda (January 08, 1953).³⁹ In the same letter, Fodor writes that he assumes Fulbright is currently drafting the report for the Subcommittee – one can only infer that Fodor hopes to have his views included in that report. While McCarthy is investigating the Voice of America,

³⁵ BCN 105:27.

³⁶ J. William Fulbright Papers, Senate Floor, Remarks about USIA & News Reporters, Series 71, Box 11, Folder 23. Congressional Record, 29 May 1957, p. 7183.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 7185.

³⁸ BCN 105:27.

³⁹ BCN 105:27.

Fodor sends letters to Fulbright stressing the importance of the radio as a medium to spread ideas behind the iron curtain (17 March & 31 May 1953).⁴⁰ Still, Fulbright informs him, VOA will probably have to be cut back rather drastically. But because the Hickenlooper Subcommittee is so satisfied with its hearings, he has hopes that the other activities won't be attained by the mix-up McCarthy is causing (03 April 1953).⁴¹ Fodor is worried anyway: McCarthy's infamous investigators Cohn and Schine have protested to Secretary of State Dulles about the existence of *Die Neue Zeitung* (28 April 1953).⁴²

It is after this point that Fulbright becomes notably disillusioned with the project: For one thing, there is the Republican government that seems to him to lack leadership and direction and is thus completely unpredictable (30 April & 26 May 1953).⁴³ Then there is McCarthy, who seems to be the only person knowing what they're up to – and they're not up to any good – in an entirely confused State Department. And, on top of all that, the new Administrator of the IIA, Robert Johnson, has plans for the agency that do not agree with Fulbright at all (13 May 1953).⁴⁴ Those plans are to create a new information agency that will be independent from the State Department.⁴⁵

The creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) on August 01, 1953 marks the success of these plans.⁴⁶

In a letter dated August 08, 1953, Fodor expresses how he, too, is already disappointed with the new agency. Awaiting the decision as to which staff will have to go and who will get to stay, he informs Fulbright that after the budget cuts the tendency is to keep those Foreign Service Officers who are permanent employees and enjoy civil servant status. Fodor himself is a Foreign Service Specialist and temporary. He „thought it was the aim of the new agency to get experts into the organisation and not bureaucrats“. Fodor can only hope to keep his position „after 30 years of honorable service in American journalism but – who knows?“. ⁴⁷ In his reply, Fulbright exudes palpable pessimism. He hopes the USIA will have enough reason to hold on to Fodor, but according to his observations, the

⁴⁰ BCN 105:26.

⁴¹ BCN 105:26.

⁴² BCN 105:26.

⁴³ BCN 105:26 & Series 88:1, Box 7, Folder 3.

⁴⁴ BCN 105:26.

⁴⁵ Krugler, p. 201.

⁴⁶ Fact Sheet, U. S. Information Agency, May 1961, p. 1. RG 306, General Records of the U. S. Information Agency (USIA). Subject Files, 1953-2000. Box 1, Folder „Organization, 1945-1961“. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

new government's staff policy is entirely chaotic. He wishes he could do something to help Fodor, but doesn't know what that might be, fearing also that „a Democrat's support won't have the desired effect“ (August 15, 1953).⁴⁸ Quite tellingly, the last exchange that Fodor and Fulbright have on the subject of US Public Diplomacy that year is when Fodor informs his correspondent, in a most sober and laconic way, „that the Frankfurt edition of 'Die Neue Zeitung' has been abolished, but that the Berlin edition will continue to exist. I have been asked to continue as its editor.“ (24 September 1953).⁴⁹

This is far from ending the correspondence between the two, but it virtually ends their discussing US information policy, except for such factual statements as budget cuts and other developments. The USIA has been created, it has not met either of the two actors' expectations, and the window of opportunity has been closed. Fodor and Fulbright remain in contact, but much less so than in the two years examined here.

8. Conclusion

The paper has shown how Fodor tried to get across to Senator Fulbright with his ideas on American public diplomacy, because he lacked opportunities to make himself heard within the State Department, which employed him. Fulbright's reaction to this seems to have depended on his own attitude towards the particular items that Fodor requested of him. Personal requests, such as supporting *Die Neue Zeitung* or discussing Fodor's future with certain persons in responsible positions, he almost always fulfilled or promised to fulfill. However, when it came to how American propaganda ought to be conducted, Fulbright's letters indicate support only where he agreed with Fodor's viewpoints. That there ought to be a program, and that it ought to be an assertive one, was such a point of agreement. But financing newspapers in return for favorable reporting on the United States of America? Not something that Fulbright could support or would even, out of politeness, pretend to support.

⁴⁷ Series 88:1, Box 7, Folder 3.

⁴⁸ Series 88:1, Box 7, Folder 3.

⁴⁹ BCN 105:25.

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