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Turkish Culture as European Culture? – Cultural Diplomacy and Turkey’s road towards EU-Membership

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Abstract

In 2005, after over 40 years of waiting, Turkey was finally granted accession status by the European Union. However, the majority of EU-citizens, especially in the biggest member state Germany, are against a Turkish membership. This negative perception of Turkey poses a threat to its EU-aspirations, as the accession will depend on the ratification by the member states and, ultimately, the opinion of their respective publics. This project explores the negative perception of Turkey in Germany and recommends appropriate measures to change it. At its core, it scrutinizes the perception of Turkey via a qualitative study in general and various aspects of the Turkish culture amongst a sample of 21 Germans (n=21). Drawing on public and cultural diplomacy theory it argues that countries can influence foreign publics by presenting themselves as similar to the receiver culture. Thereby social identification theory is employed as a means to explicate the study findings in a framework that can inform such activities. The results show that the German respondents tend to view, inter alia, the main cultural differences between the EU-member states and Turkey in values, seen as derived from the Christian, respectively, Islamic religion. Further objections appear to be the perceived complexity and nationalistic attitude of Turkey, as well as the dominance of the (religious) community and the discrimination of women. A main factor reinforcing this view seems to be the influence of Turkish immigrants in Germany. The results could be tentative but suggestive input for further Turkish bilateral communication activities and more generalizable research in this still scarcely explored area.

1. Introduction

“The duration of the membership application of Turkey to the EU is about to break a historical record [... reaching back to the 1960s] it has become the longest application process of all times” (Ücer, 2006, p.198). The roots of this situation lead to a controversial debate in the European Union that has been smouldering since Turkey was ultimately granted accession status in 2005 (Wuermeling, 2007). While both, the EU-member states governments and the European public are divided on this issue – with an overall public opposition (EC, 2008) – the debate centres around both, the ‘hard factors’, the formal political, economic and legislative accession criteria, and the ‘soft’ - cultural aspects. The latest turbulences in 2013 around the Turkish government’s handling of the revolts at ‘Gezi park’ as well as its involvement into an extensive corruption scandal are challenging Turkey’s position once more (DTN 2014; EurActiv 2013; Schönwälder 2013).

Public opinion is a factor in foreign policy (Holsti, 1992). In the case of Turkey’s accession process this is especially true, as some EU-members discuss referenda on this matter and the EU integration process is currently facing a deep crisis: In a public mood of general EU-scepticism (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2006) and ‘enlargement fatigue’, Europe’s core integration pact, the Lisbon treaty, was refused (O’Brennan, 2013). Thus, while the EU “is striving for bridging the gap between itself and its citizens, and for more
democracy, participation and legitimacy”, Turkey must overcome the crucial hindrance of an unfavourable public opinion (Baykal, 2006, p.75). In this respect Germany could be one of these obstacles, not just because its public is one of the most sceptical opponents of a Turkish accession (EC, 2008), but – considered as the European “integration motor” (EurActive, 2006) – it is also one of the most influential members states.

Public diplomacy – and its linchpin cultural diplomacy – can be crucial means to influence foreign public opinion. This is a fact that has not just been acknowledged by Turkish foreign ministry officials, who see it as a priority for Turkish foreign affairs (Karabat, 2007), but that has already been translated into practice (Kalin, 2011). Nevertheless, to confront Turkey’s difficulties and challenge it’s lacking “PR gene” (Economist, 2005, p.48), it has to be clear what the reasons behind this oppositional mood are, above all, in Germany.

In order to understand these issues, this study, firstly, identifies and examines themes for public opposition to a Turkish EU-membership in Germany using a review of the respective literature. Then the social identification theory as well as stereotyping is explained, as a means to format the study findings into a framework that can inform public diplomacy activities. After this section, the theoretical and practical dimensions of public and cultural diplomacy are elaborated, followed by an overview of the research methodology applied, as well as an analysis of the data gathered. This leads, finally, to a recommendation for possible Turkish public diplomacy activities in Germany and a conclusion, sketching further research possibilities.

2. Literature Review

"And one of the big themes about why Turkey cannot become a member of the European Union is because it is a Christian club. This is in our view very, very dangerous.”

Turkish finance minister Ali Babacan at Davos Forum (Hurriyet Daily News, 2011)

There has already been a great interest from European academics to explore these ‘difficulties’, in order to establish certain trends and commonalities regarding the general perception of Turkey. Yet, just very little research was done in the context of Germany. Therefore, the following literature review will first try to point out and contextualize these issues, explored as different identities of Turkey as they are perceived in the international community, especially in terms of a possible accession. As perceptions are heavily
context-dependent, varying “from situation to situation and also from audience to audience” (Stock, 2009, p.121), a dedicated section of this review will then summarize themes and highlight nuances in the German perception of Turkey.

A first group of research concerned with the perception of Turkey comes from the field of Tourism. Yet, the majority of those studies do not match the focus of this research as they look merely on touristic aspects (Baloglu and McCleary, 1999; Yuksel and Yuksel, 2001; Yarcan and Inelmen, 2006). Sönmez and Sirakaya (2002) identify political events and conflicts, such as with the Kurds and Cyprus, as negative influence on the Turkish image. Alvarez and Korzay (2008) assert this in a study in Spain, mentioning the Kurd issue and the allegation of the Armenian genocide. Finally, a survey by Web-Tourismus (2006) in Germany gives more input. The respondents view Turkey’s image very negatively, especially regarding the factors politics, economy, living standard and liberality.

A second group of researchers based their studies on the mass media coverage of Turkey in the press in Germany (Ates, 2002; Bönsch and Langhans, 2007; Schäfer and Zschache, 2008), Britain and Germany (Inthorn, 2006), Europe (Svendsen, 2006), as well as in cartoons on Turkey in European and US media (Erensü and Adanalı, 2004). Recurring negative patterns in the media are thereby, according to all studies, concerned with human rights (Kurd issue), expected immigration into Europe and relative ‘backwardness’ in economic, political and legal terms. Schäfer and Zschache (2008) also identify Turkey’s geopolitical location as a critical point, which would ‘overstretch’ the EU. In addition, the media reports on Turkey portray the country as too culturally and religiously different for an EU-accession (Schäfer and Zschache, 2008; Inthorn, 2006; Svendsen, 2006; Erensü and Adanalı, 2004). This notion is expressed by all of them more precisely as a negative ‘otherness’ of the country. Islamic Turkey is perceived as fundamentally different – morally, culturally and politically – from the mostly Christian nations of the EU. This view reflects the often quoted idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ by Huntington (1993), who sees Turkey as a torn country that – disregarding its Arabic heritage – liked to be a Western country, although it did not share Western commonalities.

A third group of studies examines public debates about Turkey’s accession to the EU, comprising different public domains such as politics, media and economy. Some of them focus on national debates, namely Austria (Günay, 2007), Italy (Boria, 2006), France (Le
Gloannec, 2007), Germany (ESI, 2006a; Stelzenmüller, 2007), Germany and France (Demesmay and Weske, 2007; Yilmaz, 2007), Germany and Europe (Hülsse, 2006) and the Netherlands (WWR, 2004; ESI, 2006b). Others studies are concerned with the economic impact of a Turkish accession (Flam, 2003; Lejour and de Mooij, 2005). Looking at the bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU, the remaining studies explored, finally, to different extent the broader perception of Turkey at a European level. Notably, this group of studies features the widest variety of objections towards a membership in this review.

Amongst these, some studies show that Turkey is not viewed as a geographical part of Europe (Boria, 2006; Demesmay and Weske, 2007; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Müftüler-Baç, 2008; Tocci, 2007; Ücer, 2006; Yilmaz, 2007), but rather as an Asian country (Akdede and Colakoglu, 2006; Tekin, 2005). Other works identify a perceived lack of common history as an objection (Boria, 2006; Capan and Onursal 2007; Redmond, 2007; Tocci, 2007; Yilmaz, 2007): The history of the Islamic and expansionist Ottoman Empire stayed in total contrast to the European (Kütük, 2006) and posed an “insurmountable civilisational discrepancy” (Tekin, 2005, p.293).

Similar criticism is evoked by the dominance of the military (Ayoob, 2004; Barchard, 2000; Global Researcher, 2007; Kubicek, 2004; Lejour and de Mooij, 2005; Verney, 2007) and a perceived low standard of human rights (Ayoob, 2004; Barchard, 2000; Capan and Onursal 2007; Demesmay and Weske, 2007; Elver, 2005; Global Researcher, 2007; Lejour and de Mooij, 2005; Tekin, 2005). Common themes are, in particular, the rights of minorities such as the Kurds (Müftüler-Baç, 2000) and a weak social position of women (ESI, 2006a; ESI, 2006b; Verney, 2007).

Further debates centre on the questions of mass immigration (Boria, 2006; Demesmay and Weske, 2007; ESI, 2006a) and difficult integration (ESI, 2006b). Worries are thereby often based upon encounters with Turkish immigrants in the EU (Kubicek, 2004): They largely remain attached to tenets of their home society (Tekin, 2005) and thus “do not respect national or EU rights and obligations, since they elevate certain (frequently religious) practices above the law, [remain] ghettoized and refuse to become part of European societal life” (Ücer, 2006, p.205). Thereby, public opinion towards enlargement – particularly a Turkish one – is shaped by the fear of immigration, an influx of ‘outsiders’, which will not just claim resources that naturally belong to the ‘insiders’, but
which will also be threatening the norms, values and basic structure of their community (Müftüler-Baç, 2002). The latter point was associated with the apprehension, that a wave of Turkish immigrants (Kubicek, 2004) might “flood the European labour markets, taking away jobs from Western European citizens” (Ayoob, 2004, p.454), depressing wages, boosting unemployment and causing social frictions and political upheavals (Flam, 2003).

A row of studies amongst this third group of research, reflecting more political and social views, identifies a fear in the perception of Turkey, namely, that its membership would weaken the ‘European project’. In particular, some general arguments are, for example, that a Turkish accession would end the aspirations of a federal, political union (Demesmay and Weske, 2007; Tocci, 2007; ESI, 2006a), as it would harm the much-needed common identity and solidarity amongst the European citizens and as such disturb the EU’s vision of a future European demos (Tekin, 2005). Additionally, it stated a problem to stop even further enlargements (Akdede and Colakoglu, 2006; Le Gloannec, 2007; Müftüler-Baç, 2008). In the same vein, it is argued that the borders of the EU would then be extended well into the Middle East and expose it to the dangers of this region, such as Islamic fundamentalism and civil war (Tekin, 2005). Other academic works (Le Gloannec, 2007; Lejour and de Mooij, 2005; Müftüler-Baç, 2002; Müftüler-Baç, 2008) also highlight concerns in respect of the political impact, namely Turkey’s “potential weight in the decision making structures of the Union” after an accession (Baykal, 2006, p.75), due to the number of votes and seats in EU institutions that would be allocated to it (Ücer, 2006, p.204). Closely linked to this argument, is – for the greatest proportion of these studies – the budgetary cost aspect of an accession as a crucial element of objection (Demesmay and Weske, 2007; ESI, 2006a; Flam, 2003; Lejour and de Mooij, 2005; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Müftüler-Baç, 2002; Müftüler-Baç, 2008; Redmond, 2007; Tocci, 2007; Ücer, 2006). This is as Turkey, because of its demographic size and relatively underdeveloped economy with a large agricultural sector, would become a net recipient of EU transfer funds (Müftüler-Baç, 2008).

Other studies in this group inform about the understanding of Turkish culture. In this respect, a very dominant reservation against Turkey is its Islamic religion (Akdede and Colakoglu, 2006; Boria, 2006; Elver, 2005; ESI, 2006b; Kütük, 2006; Le Gloannec, 2007; Lejour and de Mooij, 2005; Müftüler-Baç, 2002; Müftüler-Baç, 2008; Redmond, 2007; Tocci, 2007; Ücer, 2006; WWR, 2004). As such, Turkey was “not a part of Christendom, to which Europe considers itself the heir” (Ayoob, 2004, p.453). While some academic works state a fear
of Islamic fundamentalism in the perception of Turkey (Hülsse, 2006; GR, 2007; Verney, 2007), it is also questioned whether ‘radical versions’ of Islam were compatible with the common values of the EU-states (Tekin, 2005). Thus, with its large and increasing Muslim population, Turkey would break the cultural homogeneity of Europe (Ücer, 2006) and hardly be absorbed by the common European identity (Tekin, 2005).

This notion goes hand in hand with another critical differentiating perception, namely the aforementioned thought of a ‘cultural clash’ (Barchard, 2000; Baykal, 2006; Elver, 2005; Günay, 2007; Kütkü, 2006; Lejour and de Mooij, 2005; Müftüler-Baç, 2008; Redmond, 2007; Stelzenmüller, 2007; Tocci, 2007; Yılmaz, 2007; WWR, 2004). To be more precise, the Turks are seen, among others, as traditional and nationalistic, traits that were not just incompatible with the ‘European ideals’, but that would pose a civilisational divide between Christians and Muslims (Kubicek, 2004).

Finally, the most common perception observed in this third group of studies is, again, the perceived ‘otherness’ of Turkey, that acts like a ‘red line’ in all arguments identified. Accordingly, Turkey’s ‘Europeaness’ is doubted as it is seen as fundamentally different from European identity, respectively, underdeveloped in terms of culture, democratic values or politics. Or in other words: having a history, culture and religion that was outside of Europe, the Turks would just not look, dress, pray and think like Europeans (Kubicek, 2004). As such, they have “served as the convenient ‘other’, telling us what Europe is not” (Günay, 2007, p.49).

However, there are also some shortcomings in this third group of research. First of all, some of these studies show a partly vague distinction between the public view and other fields such as politics (Barchard, 2000; Boria, 2006; Demesmay and Weske, 2007; Global Researcher, 2007; Kütkü, 2006; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Verney, 2007), while others are rather out of date (Barchard, 2000; Müftüler-Baç, 2000; Müftüler-Baç, 2002). Others, however, identify perceptions without continuously stating precise sources (Barchard, 2000; Boria, 2006; Demesmay and Weske, 2007; Elver, 2005; Flam, 2003; Kubicek, 2004; Kütkü, 2006; Lejour and de Mooij, 2005; Redmond, 2007). Moreover, the majority of these works omits to specify certain aspects of their findings, for example, the ‘common values’ (Tekin, 2005) of or the ‘cultural homogeneity’ in Europe (Ücer, 2006). Lastly, almost all of these studies – except for (Hülsse, 2006; ESI, 2006a; ESI, 2006b) – base their identification of themes merely on secondary sources instead of primary data.
A fourth group of research are, finally, opinion surveys on the public perception of Turkey, that all, except for the qualitative study Kemming and Sandıkçı (2007), employ quantitative methods. Amongst these, the Anholt Nation Brand Index (Barysch, 2007), the Harris Interactive Study (Harris Interactive 2007) and the Atlantics Trends Survey (GMF, 2008a; GMF, 2008b), were conducted internationally and merely present an unspecific negative perception of Turkey within their respective samples. Others, however, focusing on European samples, provide more detailed information. According to the Austrian euroSearch study (EuroSearch, 2007), for example, almost 61% of the respondents would not support a Turkish accession, even if immigration wasn’t an issue and Turkey fulfilled all accession criteria. Points of most critique were ‘slow speed of reforms’ (67.8%), the Cyprus conflict (83%), ‘lack of integration will of (Turkish) immigrants’ (51.7%) and geography (Turkey is no European country; 74.3%). Finally, the Eurobarometer surveys, conducted by the European Commission in all EU-member-states, gathered the broadest data regarding the perception of a Turkish accession. Accordingly, 55% of the respondents oppose a membership (EC, 2008), seeing developments in the fields of human rights (83%) and economy (76%) as a crucial tasks to fulfil before an accession. While fear of immigration (63%) and cultural differences (55%) are main points of concern (EC, 2005), accession is seen as mainly in Turkey’s interest (52%; EC, 2006).

Finally, the qualitative study by Kemming and Sandıkçı (2007) is looking at the attitudes behind the negative perception of Turkey based on the results in the Anholt Nation Brand Index. Accordingly, factors influencing the general perception of Turkey seem to be, amongst others, familiarity with Turkish immigrants and integration success, while criticism of religion is mainly linked to the extent of religious practise (the public visibility of religion). However, these findings are barely valuable to answer the aims of this paper as the study used rather economical criteria.

The German perception of Turkey appears to be, interestingly, relatively poorly explored by research. A closer look at the research covered above, shows that except for some works, which examined German press coverage (Ates, 2002; Bönsch and Langhans; 2007; Inthorn, 2006; Schäfer and Zschache, 2008), no primary research was conducted, to unfold the German view on Turkey (Demesmay and Weske, 2007; ESI, 2006b; EC, 2006a; EC, 2008; GMF, 2008b; Stelzenmüller, 2007; Hülsse, 2006; Web-Tourismus,
Yet, a closer look on the works focusing on or including Germany shows two things. Firstly, that the ‘German perception’ tends to demonstrate a relatively strong opposition or negative attitude towards Turkey and an EU-membership of this country (EC, 2006; EC, 2008; Schäfer and Zschache, 2008; Web-Tourismus, 2006). Secondly, it reveals that the identified themes and reasoning behind this opposition are not significantly different from those already found in other countries: Turkey is again seen as marked by economical, political and social backwardness. It was rather the cultural, historical, geographical and religious ‘other’ to the European West, a fact that is felt especially true in the terms of values (GMF, 2008b).

Yet, some features in the German perception of Turkey are worth to being highlighted. According to the broad data from the Eurobarometer study 64 (EC, 2005), Germans show considerably stronger opposition to a Turkish accession in the factors culture, economy, human rights and immigration than the European average, while the latter point seems to be of special importance (Ates, 2002; Demesmay and Weske, 2007; ESI, 2006b; Inthorn, 2006; Müftüler-Bac, 2002). Religion plays, moreover, also a significant role. According to Ayoob (2004, p.453), there is a deep-seated fear in Germany, that a Turkish accession might lead to a major Islamic presence in Europe, “which will dilute European cultural and religious distinctiveness”. Within the perception of Islamic Turkey, there is also an implicit link to fundamentalism and terrorism. Thus, Turkey posed a potential threat (Hülsse, 2006), or as Inthorn (2006, p.86) points out, the “European ‘self’ has to be guarded from the Muslim ‘other’”.

Drawing on this first review of literature, one can conclude the following: Research results have not just shown general criticism in the perception of Turkey, but also identified – more or less consistently – several reasons for opposition of an accession. Accordingly, Turkey is seen as fundamentally different from Europe, above all, in terms of culture, values and religion. Additional factors are a perceived backwardness in terms of politics, economy and law, especially in the field of human rights. Other main critical arguments are its geography outside the boundaries of Europe, the dominance of the military, a lack of common history, as well as expected immigration and integration problems. Finally, a more political field are apprehensions of a weakening of the ‘European project’. This is due to the estimated costs of an accession, problems in political and cultural integration, as well as economic and social disadvantages. However, there are no distinct, appropriate studies that have explored in-depth the rational and emotional thinking behind the German public opposition of a Turkish EU-accession.
The literature review has distilled the perception of Turkey to certain themes, indicating to us ‘what’ is thought about Turkey. Taking an abstract look at these findings, it could be said that their overall essence – that comprises all issues identified – is the perceived ‘otherness’ of Turkey. This separating mindset uses certain categories to support a feeling of ‘us against them’ to differentiate oneself from the ‘foreign other’. If we are to change what is thought about Turkey, we have to know the functionalities, the why, behind the emergence of such perceptions. This will then enable us to see how we can influence them. So before moving further to the definition of objectives and the exploration of reasoning, this dominant theme shall be contextualized in the frame of social identification theory.

3. Theoretical Framework

The social identity theory (SIT) can serve as a useful theoretical framework to explain how perceptions of ‘others’ emerge and on what functionalities they base on, especially, as it has already been used to analyze perceptions of foreign nations (Christie et al., 2006; Rivenburgh, 2000).

SIT was advanced by Tajfel and Turner (1982) to understand intergroup behaviour. It supposes, that “individuals are motivated to achieve a positive ‘social identity’ [defined as] that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, cited in Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994, p.61). Thereby it bases on four psychological processes, namely social categorization, identification, comparison and group distinctiveness. In particular, it says, that (1) we categorize ourselves and others to give our world structure; (2) we identify ourselves belonging to a certain group (our in-group) to reinforce our self-esteem; (3) we position ourselves by comparing us with other groups (out-group), showing favourable bias towards our in-group; (4) we desire the identity of our in-group – and this can be said to be the core aim – to be both distinct from and positively compared with other groups (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). The categories, in which in-groups discriminate against out-groups, can be either social, such as sex, religion, nationality, political affiliation etc., or personal, such as character, bodily attributes, intellect, taste etc. (Turner, 1982). In the categorization process itself, communication plays an important role, as it is likely that “levels of in-group bias and feelings of antipathy towards the out-group [...] increase in
proportion to the degree of threat to identity implied by the communication from the out-group” (Brown and Ross 1982, p.161).

Closely linked to SIT are also two other psychological processes: stereotyping and ethnocentrism. The term ‘stereotyping’ was coined by Walter Lippmann, referring to plates used for the printing process of newspapers, enabling a quick and inexpensive reproduction of many copies of a message (Lasorsa, 2009). Stereotyping can be seen as a routine means of our mind to economically structure our perception of the environment that can’t be experienced in every detail (Kunczik, 1997). Thereby, “we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture” (Lippmann, 1922, Chapter VI). As such, stereotypes themselves are statements in simplified categories, grasping general rather than individual attributes (Kunczik, 1997), or, as Lasorsa (2008, p.1) puts it, they are a judgments of “others not on knowledge of their individual complexities but on their inclusion in an out-group”. In the context of nations, do stereotypes also have an integrative function, as “negative images of other groups strengthen the cohesion in one’s own group” (Kunczik, 1997, p.39), while “any characteristic which defines the in-group as different will tend to be evaluated positively” (Turner, 1982, p.35). This behavior is also explained as ethnocentrism, stating that ethnocentrically oriented people are inclined to use their own *weltanschauung* as a superior benchmark to judge other cultures (Sumner, 1906, cited in Kunczik, 1997).

Now that we know *what* is said about Turkey and *why* it is said, we can look at *how* to use these functionalities of perception building to influence public opinion. Public diplomacy (PD) can be seen as a means in international relations that is concerned with how out-groups communicate themselves to in-groups. It grounds on the idea of influencing foreign public opinion via a “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments” (Malone, 1985 cited in Stignitzer and Wamser, 2006, p.435 f.). To take the opinion of these audiences into account makes sense as the democratisation and the influence of people on their elected governments is increasing (PDF, 1999). Considered as a ‘soft power’, PD does not employ ‘usual’ diplomatic means such as (military) coercion or direct financial aid. In fact, it rests on a country’s intangible assets like culture, values and policies, respectively, on “the way a country expresses its values in its culture and […] relations
with others”. Vice versa, if the content of these assets is not attractive, PD activities that ‘broadcast’ them cannot produce soft power (Nye, 2008, p.95).

The practical perspectives of PD comprise, according to Cull (2008), five different fields, namely research, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting. While research is concerned with the execution of opinion polls, advocacy creates and publishes information materials. Cultural diplomacy, in contrast, promotes the interest of an actor via the dissemination of cultural activities. Finally, exchange diplomacy concentrates on exchange programmes (e.g. for university students), whereas international broadcasting manages the broadcast of balanced news over public national radio services.

Considering the fields of categorization suggested by SIT as well as the importance of cultural aspects identified in the literature review, a culture-centered PD approach seemed to be most suitable for the purpose of this paper. Cultural diplomacy (CD) deals with “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding” (Cummings, 2003, p.1). Constantinescu describes it similarly as “a course of actions, which are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests” (Constantinescu, 2013). Thereby, CD is seen as a linchpin of PD, due to the increased importance of culture in global relations (Demos, 2007; U.S. Department of State, 2005). In contrast to traditional one-way communication, culture-centered approaches allow the participant cultures equal access to participate in the discourse, as well as equal influence on its outcomes. Hence, they stimulate mutual understanding by concentrating on relationship building and dialogue (Dutta-Bergman, 2006). Cultural activities facilitate the engagement with others’ heritage and living culture and to find commonalities and differences. As such they reduce persistent national stereotypes, something that is particularly important for countries suffering reputational damage (Demos, 2007).

Accordingly, CD activities comprise, amongst others, intercultural exchange programs, educational exchanges and scholarships, cultural visits of artists, cultural event organization, international culture related conferences and workshops, as well as language promotion (DiploFoundation, 2003).

Applying these results – the knowledge of the what, the why and the how – to the issue of this paper, one could conclude that Turkey, as an out-group, should seek to decrease its
‘potential threat’ to the citizens of the EU-member state Germany as the in-group. By communicating its identity through CD activities that highlight similarities to the culture of the EU-member states, Turkey could make its culture more ‘appealing’ and might reduce opposition to an accession. Research has proposed different approaches to inform recommendations for such CD activities. These include agenda-setting (Manheim & Albritton 1984), agenda-building (Kiousis & Wu 2008) and media framing (Entman, 2004). However, as this paper merely aims to gain new insights into a specific public opinion, they are not relevant in the focus of this research.

Thus, based on these conclusions and the results of the literature review, the aims of my research are

• to explore in-depth the public understanding of Turkish culture in Germany and identify cultural opinions regarding a Turkish accession into the EU
• to unfold the reasoning and attitudes behind the German informants’ opinions and attitudes
• to make recommendations for cultural diplomacy programs that the Turkish government can apply in Germany

4. Methodology

The literature review has revealed a broad analysis of what aspects the opposition regarding a Turkish EU-accession comprises of. Yet, there is a gap of research that provides in-depth knowledge about the thoughts, reasons and feelings behind the German perception of a Turkish EU-accession, and that also accounts for the possibility of further themes.

Therefore, an inductive approach was chosen where the theory emerges from the research. As in such an explorative and flexible methodological design “ideas occur as data are collected and examined”, it gave the opportunity to uncover all aspects of the research issue (WSU, 2009, p.53). Thereby a qualitative research method, which allows exploring the motivations of informants, provided the in-depth insights that were needed to meet the research objectives and operationalize the findings of SIT in practice. In contrast to quantitative research, the explorative nature of qualitative methods facilitates more diversity in responses and depicts these as authentic as possible. Furthermore, it “does not try to gloss over the subtleties and complications [...] that are essential aspects of human experience” (Denscombe, 2007, p.80). As such, it was thought to be more likely to
decrease the level of stereotypic replies, as people are prompted to reason their opinion. Finally, the qualitative results could also complement the predominantly quantitative primary data already gathered (Collis and Hussay, 2003; Daymon and Holloway, 2002, Bryman, 1988).

Using a qualitative approach, the research could have been biased by the researcher’s personal attitude towards a Turkish accession. This is due to the fact, that qualitative research – compared to quantitative – is inclined to be characterized by more involvement of the researcher, as well as more subjectivity (Daymon and Holloway, 2002). However, its advantage in terms of researcher involvement is the absence of ‘interfering factors’ such as hypotheses and influence on answers. Nevertheless, to minimize presumptions and biased or leading questions (Bell, 2006) the interview guide was checked and double-checked with peers before conducting the research.

The qualitative research was conducted in the form of semi-structured in-depth focus group interviews. In contrast to one-to-one interviews, the interaction of focus group settings tend not just to motivate participants more to voice their own opinions and experiences, but also to expand and refine their ideas, perceptions and judgements of the topic that would be otherwise less accessible. This should facilitate the researcher, to understand the reasoning behind the views voiced (Daymon & Holloway, 2002; Collis and Hussay, 2003; Denscombe, 2007). Moreover, employing a focus group approach also allowed gathering plenty of different insights in the most economic way (see also Daymon & Holloway, 2002).

Following a combination of convenience and snowball sampling (Daymon & Holloway, 2002), sample was taken from German citizens. As a German citizen, this sample was readily available for the author and, apart from that, especially reasonable in the context of the research question: Firstly, because knowledge about the issue in Germany was expected to be relatively high, due to the fact, that she has the highest rate of Turkish immigrants in the EU (2,5m, Auswärtiges Amt, 2009; Wogatzky, 2005) and there is continuing public discussion around both, Turkish immigration and EU-accession (ESI, 2006b). Secondly, most tourists visiting Turkey are from Germany (4,2m in 2007; ESI, 2006c).
In order to reach data saturation the sample consisted of 21 participants (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005) with ages ranging from 16 to 71, reflecting the most significant demographic characteristics of the German population (A1). The sample was divided into three focus groups of six persons each, as well as three persons for one-to-one interviews for the pilot study. It was also attempted to – as far as possible – assemble homogeneous groups in terms of gender, education and social background, as it is in such constellations more likely that meanings and emotions surface, that might not be articulated elsewhere (Daymon & Holloway, 2002).

The informants were approached via email and telephone, with a brief explanation of the interview topic, interview setting as well as the aims and use of the research. Matters of confidentiality and privacy were also outlined and informed consent was sought (A3). The interviews themselves took place in Juli 2009 in Germany, at private venues in relaxed atmosphere. Both, pilot interviews and focus group discussions followed a common guideline of themes and were digitally recorded and then transcribed. The interviews were of ca. 30 min. (pilot) respectively between 45 and 120 min. (focus groups) in duration.

Finally, it was also tried to ensure the credibility of the research and as such its trustworthiness (Daymon and Holloway, 2002). To achieve this, a member check with some respondents of the sample was conducted in the interviews of the pilot study: by summarizing, repeating and paraphrasing their responses to them feedback about the coherence of their understanding was gathered. This helped to ensure the correct understanding and interpretation of the replies. The pilot study and the peer checking of the interview questions with some of the colleagues before the focus group interviews, led to some important corrections and amendments (compare A2 and A3). Finally, an audit trail was kept, including all study materials, and it was attempted to most completely disclose the setting and the execution of the research. This should ensure that the link between the research findings and the data collected is clear.

For the data analysis codes and categories were developed. In a first step, open coding helped to identify and name core themes that emerged from the data (A5 and A6). In a second step, axial coding was used to relate these main categories and subcategories (Punch, 2005). After that the codes were sorted into the categories that were informed by both, the data and the literature, and the interview input gained was analyzed and

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appendacies include interview questions; for practical reasons transcripts have not been attached: however, citations in the following analysis are referring to the transcripts
summarised for each category. Furthermore, significant direct quotes from the interviews were given to justify the findings. This was accompanied by a continuous cross-referencing to themes in the literature, highlighting similarities and differences, to incorporate the findings within the picture of existing research. Finally, the data were interpreted to make theoretical inferences (Daymon and Holloway, 2002).

5. Limitations
The research also comprises some shortcomings. Firstly, due to time and language constraints, the literature examined in the review cannot account for the whole scope of literature available, especially the considerable amount written in Turkish (Soler i Lecha, 2008). Secondly, the German Democratic Republic (DDR) represents another relevant demographic category, due to different socialization, for example, through education and media. Yet, just one such native informant could be included in the sample. Moreover, in terms of data saturation, the study has to be considered as a pre-study: It’s laying the ground for further, more generalizable research and its results are therefore just of tentative nature. It should also be kept in mind that questions and one transcript were translated for this study from English to German, and vice versa (chapter 10.3 and 10.4). However, to ensure accuracy and maintain validity in translations a peer-review was conducted. Finally, the sampling technique, might have led to some bias in replies, as it is linked to the personal milieu of the researcher. Hence, the research outcomes must be considered within the scope of the special setting and environment of this study.

6. Analysis
The following analysis highlights commonalities and differences regarding aspects of Turkish culture in the perception of the German interviewees that will later help to shape the recommendations for possible CD activities based on PD. It comprises the categories sources of information, immigrants, social distinction, religion, values and tradition, politics, history, identity, as well as cultural contributions and commonalities followed by a conclusion.

6.1. Sources of information
In matters of general information sources about Turkey, three ways emerged from the interviews, namely media, personal encounters in Germany and travel experiences.
Resembling the results found in the literature (see p.5-6), are the former a common source of information, that present Turkey, respectively, the Turks in a predominantly negative way (1.1.H./22; 1.5.H./75-81; 1.8.H./122; 1.10.H./212; 2.1.K./19; 6.9.M./285). In the case of travel experiences, respondents also seem to be aware of a positive bias, being exposed to the more favourable faces of Turkey (1.2.H./30-36; 1.11.H./192-193; 4.3.D./263; 5.1.R./12-13). Finally, personal encounters with Turks, including contacts with immigrants in Germany, seem to be the most influential source of information – a result that coincides with other research outcomes (see p.7). Notably, the picture here is more diverse: While face-to-face contacts with Turks tend to be experienced as positive, in impersonal contacts more differences and negative aspects are highlighted (1.10.H./145-158; 2.1.K/29-38; 4.3.D./270; 4.4.S./441).

6.2. Immigrants

Corresponding with former research (see p.7), Turkish immigrants seem to be a major factor influencing the perception of Turkey and the Turks as often voiced by the respondents directly (5.1.B./87-90; 6.2.S./43-44). Thereby negative experiences prevail, for example, the exploitation of social benefits (2.2.K./35-38), a deficient education (3.3.B./39; 3.4.B./67; 5.2.M./340-349; 5.2.A./356; 5.2.R./359-367) and, above all, the issue of integration (4.1.F./96-98; 5.1.B./86):

> That is something that people observe at some Turks here and refer to the whole of Turkey. That Turkey, as soon as it had joined the EU, would suddenly stop to integrate further, as it is already in. (5.1.R./102-104)

Another facet of the concern that sees a lack of the will to integrate is the question of look and language. While the former is an ‘obvious sign’ that distinguished Turks from Germans in the first place (5.2.A./148; 5.2.R./372), are the continued use of the Turkish language, respectively, flawed German language skills perceived as just another facet for the aforementioned reluctance (4.2.F./129; 5.2.R./210; 5.2.K./153):

> What I feel strange is if somebody is standing beside me in the metro and switches between German and Turkish. [...] Then you are feeling like being excluded in your own country, you do not understand what is happening around you. (3.3.B./48-58)

Other explanations articulated that are seen as burdens for the integration of Turkish immigrants are, for example, the influence of the family (6.2.B./58), a strong national
consciousness (5.2.B./131-133), that would make Turks insensitive towards others (5.2.R./297-298), different values (5.1.B./88-89), and the Islamic religion (6.2.S./46):

And why is it, that […] the Turkish group is the least willing to integrate? That has always to do with religious reasons. That they actually have Islam schools that no German is allowed to enter. (6.5.B./227-229)

Finally, a submissive role of women is mentioned (5.6.M./470-471) including a custom of forced marriages (1.1.H./17-18; 2.1.K/29):

My cleaner was not allowed to stay alone with me in the flat. When my wife wanted to go shopping, there was an outcry, so I had to go with her, so she [the cleaner] was left alone. And that in the middle of Munich! That is grotesque! (4.7.D./576-580)

Overall, the themes education, look, language, ‘exploitation of benefits’ and ‘position of women’ would – except for the issue of religion – expand the results found in former research, for example, by Tekin (2005) and Ücer (2006).

6.3. Social distinction

Another interesting finding – that was not identified by previous studies – is that respondents clearly distinguish between different regions, respectively, people. This happened in certain patterns, namely between the east and the west of Turkey, between cities and countryside, as well as between Turks living in Germany and in Turkey. Regarding the distinction between east and west, the west is considered to be much more European or developed, compared to an underdeveloped east (4.3.D./262-267; 5.1.M./39-41):

In addition, the country is falling into two parts, into a coast … that might be all Turks, but it is functioning quite European and then there is the Anatolian hinterland that works like Afghanistan, just to exaggerate it. (4.1.S./10-14)

More precisely respondents distinguish between metropolitan areas, first and foremost Istanbul, and the countryside: The former is said to be a different world, progressive, open, developed, modern, more towards Kemalism, educated and western. The latter, in contrast, was traditional, fanatic and with a weak position of women, including headscarves and honour killings (1.1.H./17; 2.3.K./65-68; 2.9.K./133; 2.10.K./141; 4.4.F./400-402)

I think there is a modern, developed Turkey that also thinks Western-like. But I also think there is the other Turkey, presumably on the countryside, for
example, that of honour killings and bad behaviour towards women, that goes its own way. That has nothing to do with the EU and I would not call it European either. (2.7.K./101-105)

Similarly, the third perceived distinction runs between the Turks living in Germany and those in Turkey. Accordingly, Turks living in Turkey tend to be seen as kind, peaceful and hospitable, while Turkish immigrants are seen as more extreme in terms of religion and traditions (2.1.K./16; 2.1.K./16; 2.2.K./46-57; 4.2.A./113; 5.2.P./164-165):

*A lot of them [...] are simply completely different when they are here and not in Turkey. Then religion is suddenly becoming very important, the woman is not allowed to have an opinion, she has to obey.* (2.10.K./155-157)

This finding of a multilayered diversity in the perception of Turkey leads to another point of criticism of a EU-membership that is not covered by research so far. In particular, it is said that Turkey is a huge, ambivalent, complex and confusing country, with a society comprising many variables and differences, different stages and paces of development, a country with many faces. This complexity, the absence of a homogenous entity is perceived as a disadvantage, standing in contrast to the more homogeneous Europe (1.8.H./132-133; 5.1.R./11-18 + 31-37; 6.1.B./9-10; 6.10.B./360-361):

*For me Turkey is a large bar, [...] the population, the different languages, the ethnicities, the doctrine, the government interspersed with nationalists... that is diffuse and not comparable with a modern Europe...* (4.4.F./406-410)

### 6.4. Religion

Matching previous research (see p.8) religion is a very dominant factor in the respondent’s perception of Turkey: Being asked about their familiarity with Turkish culture or cultural differences to the EU, religion is often mentioned like a shortcut (1.1.H./12; 1.8.H./130; 4.3.A./244; 5.1.A./7), sometimes even implicitly as by one respondent, speaking about experiences with Turks at work:

*There I experience relatively few culture [...] They do not wear a headscarf and do not live out religion that much.* (3.1.B./11-12)

Furthermore, most of the respondents are convinced that religion does play a role for a Turkish accession (e.g. 5.8.A./M./R./B./526; 4.2.J./175-177). Thereby, religion as a public matter was set in contrast to its private role in Europe (3.8.B./175), reflecting findings by Kemming and Sandikci (2007):
Actually it should not play a role. But it does in the case of Turkey, as religion is no private matter that is not linked with the daily contact of the people, but it does have an implication even into the behaviour of the state. (6.5.M./177-181)

Religion is, as will become obvious, inseparably linked to different fields of perceptions and mentioned as a core reason of objection to an accession. Thus, the Turkish accession cannot be discussed without speaking about Islam as well. In particular, Islam is seen, for example, as a burden for European integration because of fundamental differences between religious attitudes in contrast to Christianity (1.10.H./172-173; 3.8.B./121-122; 4.2.J./175; 6.1.A./14-17; 6.4.M./148-154):

*I suppose that religion is of much higher importance than here and it becomes problematic, if the religious beliefs of the EU because of the different religions differ [...] and it is difficult to overcome such differences in a common European Union. (3.9.B./151-157)*

Christianity is thereby viewed, resembling the study by Ayoob (2004), as a core asset of European culture (6.5.A./182-202), defined as an occidental culture that reaches back to Rome (5.10.R./531), with roots in Israel and the Greek-Roman faith (5.8.A./539-541). As such, the Christian way of thinking, that was characterized by love, tolerance (5.2.A./248-249) and reconciliation (4.2.S./179-181; 4.2.A./187), had left his mark on Europe, also in political terms (6.4.M./150). Islam is put in contrast to that, being marked by the attributes hatred, war (6.5.B./231-234), radicalization and fanatism (4.4.F./403), polygamy, vehement missionary work, as well as intolerance towards other religions, namely a two-class-system, where non-Moslems are seen as inferior (5.2.A./263-264). As an example the prevention of church buildings in Turkey and killings of suspected missionaries were mentioned (5.2.K./236-242):

*Here we face the Quran and it is a call for hate, murder and manslaughter, something that is not the case in the Old Testament. (4.2.A./187-188)*

*Where Islam comes from it is a religion of war to motivate people to fight and to die for their leader. That they are reacting radically to somebody who is opposed to that is clear. The Christian values of love and coexistence tolerate even other people, and that is why somebody from that cultural sphere reacts differently than we do. (5.2.A./245-249)*

Furthermore, European Christianity is seen as far more progressed in this respect (e.g. 4.5.E.): While Islam had come to a standstill centuries ago, Christianity had moved forward through the stage of enlightenment. Thus, Turkish Islam is not seen as tolerant,

Christendom did the same. But that is centuries ago […] and there comes Islam with centuries delay, having a similar sense of mission. (6.5.M./236-239)

Finally, respondents also mentioned the role of Islam as a hindrance to education and development (2.10.K./145-150; 4.8.D./639-656):

To enable education there have to be certain freedoms […] to bring European ideas there is very difficult. By permitting public opinion, TV, radio, freedom of the press, enlightenment, without being sent to prison or being killed as a missionary […] or being dispossessed, as for example happened to the patriarch of Constantinople, then there cannot be education. (4.3.A./334-344)

In short, Christianity seems to be used as a measure of comparison, describing the ‘otherness’ of Turkey. Thereby the findings presented above differ from the previous research (see p.6+8) inasmuch, as they are representing detailed characteristics of the perceived differences in values of both religions.

6.5. Values

In terms of values, a sense of community and family is stated as a dominant difference from Europe (1.7.H./94; 5.6.B./425; 6.9.B./277), representing a new topic compared to previous research. In contrast to a individual freedom and freedom of opinion lived out in Europe, the individual in Turkey had to obey the (religious) community and to take a minor role:

In this culture family and religious community come first […] own needs have to be neglected towards those of the community or prohibited completely. You will hardly find something nowadays within the EU. The same with the freedom of opinion. (2.8.K./113-118)

What distinguishes us is the freedom of the individual and not the law of God, respectively, Allah, who is cruel. Submission is the essential thing in the Islam. The freedom of the individual does not even exist, it is a taboo. (4.8.A./604-607)

Another facet of this attitude towards community and family is the issue of honour killings which is found as particularly opposed to European beliefs (2.3.K./67; 4.5.D./498; 5.6.A./420; 5.6.B./423-425). Thereby, the following statement might also
demonstrate that – in spite of the social differentiation highlighted above – the respondents’ image of Turkey is largely determined by immigrants:

_I do not know if it has something to do with the EU, if an adolescent Turk murders his sister because she has offended the concept of honour. That is so far away from our western way of thinking. That is completely exotic [...] neither do I know whether this is just related to the fact that Turkish groups, living here as guest workers might not be representative for ‘the Turks’. (6.7.M./256-262)_

Closely linked to the value of family is, furthermore, the position of women. Respondents name here the discrimination of women as an objection, including forced marriages (1.10.H./17; 2.1.K./29; 4.6.F./563) and a systematic suppression of women (6.3.A./113-114), which is seen as not compatible with advanced beliefs in European societies (2.8.K./110-111; 3.6.B./85-91; 5.6.B./470-471; 5.6.K./468). Expanding the findings of former studies (see p.7), other respondents see the hostility towards women as based on religion (4.6.A./569-570; 5.2.A./283-284). Accordingly, women were, for example, not allowed to go alone on the street (5.6.M./481; 5.6.B./483-484) or had to wear the headscarf, which is seen as sexist (4.5.E./526):

_There it is referred explicitly to Islam, by withholding women certain rights and dictating lifestyles. That is the exact contrast to a secular mentality. (6.4.G./161-162)_

6.6. Politics

Amongst the informants, politics appears to be seen as equal to the Muslim state and, thus, the political impact of Turkey on the EU perceived as a cultural interference. In particular, respondents show concerns regarding the contrast between the liberal political attitude in Europe and an anticipated restrictive notion of Turkey (5.2.K./256-257). That posed a threat to European values (1.8.H./120-121; 1.10.H./204-205; 5.7.K./508-510), such as the equality of women and Christian values like charity and tolerance (5.1.A./65-66). While some assume, that Islam was incompatible with the liberal and democratic European basic order (4.3.A./271-272), are others concerned of an imposing of different religious beliefs over Europe (6.5.A./200-202):

_Then the Islamic influence will increase. That is also something that we should not forget. It is not, that they want to impose their values upon us, but that these infiltrate us. [...] these values that we have are to be protected [...]_
if we make laws that rest on values, that are partly Christian, that are partly different from those in Turkey. There you have a massive conflict. That is a very cultural discussion. (5.1.A./68-73)

While the latter objections coincide with the results found by Ayoob (2004), Hülsse (2006) and Inthorn (2006), the following themes were not identified by the literature so far. One is, that some respondents question the willingness of Turkey and its society to progress towards and integrate into Europe (1.8.H./120; 6.5.A./200-202; 6.5.G./204-209), because of nationalism (5.1.R./102-111) or a relapse into religious ambitions (1.9.H./133-138; 5.2.R./193-195; 6.11.B./347-350):

Let us hope, that they, as a EU-member, [...] not go all of a sudden into a Islamic direction (1.10.H./173-176)

In this vein, the weak state of laicism is also criticized (1.11.H./177; 4.2.A./137-140; 6.5.G./204-209) and contrasted with the strict separation of religion and state, presumed as a core European achievement: While Europe had a democratic basic attitude, laicism in Turkey was not fully internalized by the Turks. In fact, Islam was even supportive of the state, as there was an identification of religion with nationalism (4.2.D./159-160; 4.2.D./207-208):

They should keep quiet for now. The people and intellectuals should first understand democracy. And they should also want it! The people should first educate and inform themselves... (4.4.F./402-405)

Nationalism is, finally, also criticized in Turkish political statements especially in context of Prime Minister Erdogan (4.1.D./100; 4.1.A./102; 5.2.R./208-211):

But I see a great aggression, a great chauvinism towards neighbouring countries, [...] in the published statements of the government. That is not the behaviour of a state, were you would say ‘that is the kind of person I would like to invite to my peaceful home’... and that precisely is the EU. [...] why should I invite such a troublemaker that is always flexing his muscles and boasting on the street? (6.3.L./123-130)

6.7. History

History is – in contrast to religion and other study findings (see p.6) – for some respondents not seen as important regarding a Turkish accession (1.8.H./102; 2.6.K./89; 6.3.A./90-93). Yet, some of them criticise that Turkey lacked a critical attitude towards its history, which is seen as a crucial characteristic of modern countries (2.6.K./89-95):
I think solely the way that the state Turkey handled the Armenian question in history, that they want to completely cover up genocide, is a statement how a state handles its history. There I wonder whether this is a state we want to have in an open Europe... (6.3.A./103-106)

However, another respondent does see a stronger role for history as a determining factor shaping cultural identity. As such, the common European history would bind Europe together, but at the same time exclude Turkey, whose nationalistic identity was still linked to its Osmanic-imperialist history (4.1.D./66-80).

*History does not finish by saying the Sultan is gone... it is still inside, it lives on.* (4.3.D./294-295)

*That is the problem of a state that has nothing to do with an enlightened, secular state of European pattern. [...] That is a process that needs a long time. If you say 'they can join the EU in 500 years’, then we could surely agree on that. But now we are speaking about a process of 10 to 20 years and that is historically just too short to make a change.* (4.4.D./368-374)

While the former themes have not appeared in the literature examined, the later view coincides with previous research observations, found, for example, by Kütük (2006).

### 6.8. Identity

Finally, the issue of identity is stated as a problem, as an EU-member Turkey would dilute the EU, seen as a homogenous circle of states with a common history and relative similar orientation (2.11.K./165; 5.7.K./508-510; 6.1.G./30-38). In contrast, others find, reinforcing a theme identified by Tekin (2005), that the European identity was just in the process of forming and a Turkish accession would threaten it (4.4.E./460-475; 6.10.A./309-319; 6.10.L./300-306), all the more, as some feel, that not all Turks indentified themselves with Europe and wanted an accession (5.1.K./113-114; 6.5.S./211-212; 6.5.A./221-222):

*Let us say, this thing goes towards a United States of Europe. That requires that there is a feeling of community, that it is not just a mere economic construct but an ideological union, one that has the cultural pillars of the occident as columns. That is why you also have to ask whether Turkey also belongs to Europe culturally. Where does Europe end?* (5.1.R./51-56)

### 6.9. Cultural contributions and commonalities

Replies to the question on contributions of Turkish culture to and shared culture with Europe are rare and partly marked by irony or sarcasm (4.9.A./671; 5.6.A./420). However, some respondents state – in other contexts – the important role of science and
research in ancient Turkey (2.10.K./145f.; 6.11.L./335-338). In the same vein, ancient technologies, architecture and social system of the Ottoman Empire are mentioned positively (4.11.D./671-672), as well as Turkish hospitality (6.9.M./285) and, contradicting to aforementioned findings, the value of religion that had lost its significance in Europe (4.5.D./535-545; 4.8.A./599-602). The same is said about the importance of the family (5.6.A./428-431; 5.11.P./581-582). In terms of commonalities respondents name the intermingling of Turkey and the periphery of Europe, for example, in Alhambra in Spain (6.11.A./336), on Rhodes (1.10.H./145) and on the Balkan (5.11.R./564; 6.11.S./332), as well as the ministry of St. Paul and the roots of Christianity at the Turkish coast (6.11.B./328). Finally, other respondents refer to the Byzantine Empire as a common heritage (4.1.S./61-64):

*Turkey is also a bit Byzantine. It was conquered and also a bit Europeanized. A part of Turkish identity is also European. That way you can understand why they want it.* (5.11.R./575-578)

### 6.10. Summary

In conclusion, the following tentative results were found amongst the informants: Apart from the media, experiences with immigrants – and here the issue of integration in particular – tend to be a major factor of influence. Interestingly, informants clearly distinguish between regions and people in their perception of Turkey, namely along the attributes modernity on the one side and backwardness on the other. The Islamic religion tends to be seen as a burden for European integration because of fundamental differences between the tolerant and enlightened Christianity and an intolerant and radical Islam. Furthermore, the weak absence of individual freedoms is criticized, due to the dominance of the (religious) community that also led to discrimination of women. Objection is, moreover, evoked by Turkey’s perceived complexity and nationalistic, unstable (political) attitude compared to a liberal and secular mindset in Europe. This is coincided with a feeling of threat, that a complex and inhomogeneous Turkey might dilute European identity and integration. However, although marginal and partly marked by irony, respondents also see positive aspects of Turkish culture such as, inter alia, the importance of family and hospitality, achievements in ancient sciences and the intermingling of cultures at the periphery of the EU. In the following chapter, these findings will be introduced into the recommendations for possible CD activities.
7. Tentative recommendation for a cultural diplomacy campaign informed by SIT and the research findings

This project has an academic focus but is also aimed at making practical implications, namely to implement the results gathered into measures that can positively influence the German perception of Turkey. According to SIT, the more Turkey can be presented as ‘we’ – as cultural European from a German perspective – the less threatening it is perceived. Accordingly, the ‘message’ of such activities should express, that Turkey has always been contributing to and sharing aspects of European culture.

7.1. Challenges

Considering the results of the analysis and the limitations in terms of generalization, some main challenges emerge that may be especially addressed by CD activities in Germany: The first is to show similarities between the religious values of Christianity and Islam, as this tends to be at the core of the perceived differences between the European (in-group) and the Turkish (out-group) culture. A second hindrance might be, that the success of simple exchange programs might be limited, as the respondents tend, firstly, to clearly distinguish between certain regional areas and, secondly, to be aware of the biased picture that travel experiences create. Yet, this might be overcome by intensified personal contacts that seem to be more favorable for positive perceptions. Additionally, it might be worth to account for the Turkish immigrants in Germany, as they seem to significantly shape the perception of Turkish culture. Finally, one may also conclude that information about Turkish contributions to European culture is low. However, European scepticism towards Turkey is mainly caused by a simple lack of knowledge about Turkish culture (Können, 2009). Hence, possible CD activities, as presented in the following, might help to increase knowledge about Turkey as ‘the other’ and shed light on the ‘complex and inscrutable’ picture of Turkey.

7.2. Targets

A CD campaign has to be aimed at certain targets. In respect of the purpose of this paper, three target audiences seem to be most appropriate: firstly, the German public as the political sovereign and, secondly, journalists and other opinion leaders. Regarding the selection of media, two groups should be addressed, namely local newspapers, as well as national newspapers, online media and TV stations. While the former might take up on local events, are the latter especially suitable to cover activities in cultural sections and documentaries, as well as to be addressed via exchange programs. A sub target may be
represented, additionally, by the German members of parliament (MPs) as the core decision makers. Due to limited approachability this group might be addressed indirectly through invitations to or the patronage of events. Finally, persistent media coverage may be reached through continuing distribution of press releases, a kick-off press conference, as well as an online media center with up-to-date information on the campaign activities. Thus, in respect of the study findings and drawing on the main strategies of CD (chapter 3), a possible campaign named, for example, ‘Turkish-European Crossroads’ could include the following activities:

**7.3. Tactics**

To target journalists a start might be the organization of exchange visitations in Turkey. For example, attendants could follow the daily routine of Turkish MPs from different parties and visit NGOs like minority, gay or women organizations. This could also be accompanied by get-togethers with Christian/Orthodox/Jewish communities that could inform about the status quo of inter-religious neighborhood. Visits to schools and development projects at communities in the countryside might also be in the range of such activities. They would not just portrait the progress of social developments, but also demonstrate the liberality and openness of Turkish society, comprising democratic values such as the freedom of opinion, equality of women and religious tolerance.

To address German opinion leaders, such as scholars, an annual ‘history conference’ or a ‘conference for religious dialogue’ at a Turkish university could be organized. This could challenge concerns regarding the contradiction of education and Islam, its attitude towards history, as well as foster the understanding of Turkey as a place for critical, modern and open minded research. Activities aimed directly at the German general public and the aforementioned media could include exhibitions and events, taking place in various German cities with a significant Turkish population, such as Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt or Cologne. An exhibition ‘Muslim life in Europe’, for example, could address concerns regarding religion, portraying the daily life of about 4,1 million Muslims living in Germany (Pew Research Center, 2011), as an integral part of European reality. On the one hand, such an event could give insight in the normal routine of Europeans of Muslim faith, presenting challenges but also success stories of integration. On the other hand, it would also make use of the positive impression of immigrants that Germans tend to have when interacting with them in daily life (ZEIT Online, 2013). In addition, the exhibition
could be flanked by regular open days of Quran schools and Turkish cultural centers to inform and display transparency as well as religious liberality.

In contrast, a museum road show ‘Turkey in Europe – Europe in Turkey’ could showcase Turkish cultural and historical intermingling with Europe. This could embracing different aspects of overlaps: from the cultural melting pot at the Western coast of Turkey, over mutual influences from ancient science, architecture and technology to the introduction of coffee and spices into Europe, and, last but not least, Turkey’s democratic development beginning in the 1920s.

These activities could, finally, be accompanied by a ‘German-Turkish Cultural Weeks’-festival. This event might feature Turkish-German artists, respectively, those with Turkish background, presenting Turkish art as a common, sophisticated facet of European culture rather than an alien excrescence. Accordingly, such a festival could comprise literature readings by female Turkish authors, painters portraying modern Turkish art and film presentations, revolving around Turkish life in Germany.

8. Conclusion
This study has revealed tentative but in-depth information that could inform further research seeking to explain the oppositional mood in Germany against a Turkish EU-accession. Furthermore – taking its limitations into account (see chapter 5) – the results provide also provisional but practicable input for possible Turkish communication activities in Germany that might facilitate Turkey’s everlasting accession odyssey.

The tentative results of this study show that respondents tend to view, inter alia, the main cultural fault line between the EU and Turkey in different values seen as derived from religion. Further objections centre on the perceived complexity and nationalistic attitude of Turkey that would distinguish it from a homogenous and liberal EU, as well as the dominance of the (religious) community and the discrimination of women. Thereby, a main factor reinforcing these views seems to be the influence of the 2.5 million Turkish ‘ambassadors’ in Germany – the Turkish immigrants – that create a notable challenge for Turkish public and cultural diplomacy activities. In this respect, further research might foster new ideas that integrate them into such efforts. In addition, the results could be used as a starting point for broader research in this area that might shed more light on the sentiment of European scepticism towards Turkey – not just in Germany, but also in EU-
countries with similar opposition to a Turkish membership, like Austria, Luxemburg and France. Moreover, the research findings also point, ironically, a finger on the identity crisis of the EU: The participants’ replies allow e contrario insights into their view of EU-identity and thus enlarge the scope of this study to research exploring this field. Finally, the study has also suggested public and cultural diplomacy activities that might be able to increase the knowledge about Turkish culture in Germany and as such help to reduce concerns regarding a Turkish EU-accession. However, as the results indicate, such efforts could face significant difficulties. The success of Turkish CD campaigns will, therefore, depend on the extent to which Turkey is able to amalgamate the aspired perception of its culture with the reality of its culture.
9. Sources

9.1. Printed sources


9.2. Internet sources


ZEIT Online (2013): Mehrheit der Deutschen sieht Islam als Bedrohung, 2013, unter:
10. Appendices

10.1. Sampling Categories & Sample Profiles

The following factors determined the constitution of the sample, based on the most current demographic data found.

**Gender** (2007; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009a)

German population: ca. 82,218,000
male 40,274,3
female 41,943,5

**Age** (2007; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009b)

65+: ca. 20%
20-64: ca. 61%
0-19: ca. 19%

**Religion** (2009; FAG, 2009)

C - ca. 53m Christians: ca. 65%
U - ca. 25,3m undenominational: ca. 30,5%
Other - ca. 3.7m of Islamic and other faith: ca. 4,5% (not considered)

**Education** (2007; BFD, 2009)

School-leaving qualifications:
*Higher degrees*
A (Abitur = similar to A-Level): 23,4%
*Lower degrees*
R (Realschule = lower type of secondary school): 20,8%
SMS (Secondary modern school): 40,5%
Without degree: 3,3%
<table>
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<th>Name</th>
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<th>Gender</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Faith</th>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</table>
10.2. Interview Questions Version 1

Objectives

- to thoroughly explore the public perception of Turkish culture and identify critical themes;
- to explore the reasoning, attitudes and opinions behind the themes identified in detail
- to make recommendations for cultural diplomacy programs that the Turkish government can apply in Germany

Questions

1. Current public opinion polls show, that there is a majority of EU-citizens are opposed to a Turkish EU-accession. A main factor stated are apparently ‘cultural reasons’: Turkey is perceived as having a ‘too different culture’, that it is “not truly European” and that it would be too difficult to culturally integrate Turkey as an EU-member. What is your opinion on that?
   - Prompt: Can you think of reasons why Turkey is perceived as culturally different?

2. What differences or similarities do you see in terms of values and moral between the EU and Turkey?

3. Do you think that history is a determining factor under which a Turkish accession should be judged? If yes/no, why?

4. A major concern regarding Turkey’s accession is that it is a predominantly Muslim country. Why or why not is this point crucial?

5. Some people say if Turkey would become an EU-member this would pose a threat to European identity. To what extend do you agree or disagree with this statement? Please explain your view.

6. Another argument mentioned is Turkey’s perceived incompatibility with the ‘European traditions’. What do you think is meant with this?

7. If you have any additional concerns or fears regarding a Turkish EU-accession in matters of culture, could you specify and explain them?
10.3. Interview Questions Version 2

Introduction

The topic of this work is „The perception of Turkey as an aspiring EU-member state“. Its goal is to find out which rational & emotional reasons are behind the predominantly opposing attitude in the EU towards a Turkish accession – which doesn’t mean, that neutral or positive attitudes were excluded.

The outcomes of the study can be used relative broadly, e.g. by political institutions as governments (EU and Turkey), NGOs or political parties to inform campaigns for or against an accession, as well as a basis for further research in the academic sector.

The questions of the study will solely focus on cultural dimensions (e.g. tradition, society, values, religion etc.). Generally, the more intensive the discussion, respectively, the more divers and detailed the statements, the more information the study can gather. However, it is not a test of knowledge, meaning there are no right and wrong answers.

As the replies cannot be controlled but a certain structure for the analysis has to be maintained, some themes repeat.

The anonymity of the study participants will be maintained and by no means will names be published.

Questions

1. What is your attitude towards a Turkish EU-accession?

2. How familiar are you with Turkish culture in your daily life (e.g. products, customs, habits, artists, music etc.)?
   - Prompt: What feelings or thoughts do you have when you experience Turkish culture?
   - Prompt: Why do you feel/think like this?

3. From your personal experience: What are the most important factors that influence your views on Turkey? (e.g. own contacts, media, general emotions etc.)
   - Prompt: How do they influence you?

4. Do you think that the EU and Turkey belong to certain cultural rooms? If yes, to which and for what reasons?

5. Do you think that history is a determining factor under which a Turkish accession should be judged? If yes, why?

6. Now from a broader perspective: Do you see Turkish culture different from the culture in the EU? If yes, in what way?
   - Prompt: ... family life?
   - Prompt: ... education?
- Prompt: ... language?
- Prompt: ... certain traditions?
- Prompt: ... gender roles?
- Prompt: ... private sphere?
- Prompt: ... mentalities? (characteristics such as traditional or progressive, nationalistic or liberal, open or closed etc.)
- Prompt: ... social achievements (e.g. science, system of society, developments etc.)

7. What is your opinion on the apprehension that Turkey’s accession might pose a threat to the EU-identity?

8. Does religion play a role in your view of Turkey and a possible accession?

9. What differences or similarities do you see in terms of values between the EU and Turkey?
   - Prompt: How important are these?
   - Prompt: Why are these important?

10. If you have any additional thought or concerns regarding a Turkish EU-accession in matters of culture, could you specify and explain them?

11. Did Turkey contribute to European culture?
   - Prompt: If yes, how?
   - Prompt: How could Turkey as a member positively contribute to European culture?
10.4. Interview Questions Version 2 (German)

Einführung

Das Thema der Arbeit lautet „Die Wahrnehmung der Türkei als EU-Beitrittskandidat“. Ziel ist es herauszufinden, welche rationalen/emotionalen Gründe hinter der in der EU mehrheitlich ablehnenden Haltung gegenüber einem türkischen Beitritt liegen – was aber nicht heißt, dass eine neutrale oder positive Haltung ausgeschlossen wäre.

Die Ergebnisse der Studie können relativ breit genutzt werden, so z.B. von politischen Institutionen wie Regierungen (EU oder Türkei), NGOs oder Parteien als Basis von Kampagnen für oder gegen einen Beitritt, aber auch als Basis für weitere wissenschaftliche Forschungen.

Die Fragen der Studie werden sich ausschließlich auf den kulturellen Bereich beschränken (z.B. Tradition, Gesellschaft, Werte, Religion etc.). Dabei gilt, je intensiver die Diskussion/Interaktion bzw. je mannigfaltiger und detaillierter die Beiträge, umso mehr Material kann die Studie erfassen. Es geht dabei aber nicht um einen Wissenstest, d.h. es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.

Da ich die Antworten nicht steuern kann, aber dennoch für meine Analyse eine gewisse Struktur benötige, kann es sein, dass sich bestimmte Themen wiederholen.

Die Anonymität der Interviewteilnehmer in der Studie wird gewahrt, auf keinen Fall werden Namen veröffentlicht.

Fragen

1. Wie ist ihre generelle Einstellung gegenüber einem Türkeibeitritt?

2. Wie vertraut sind sie mit der türkischen Kultur (z.B. über Produkte, Bräuche, Künstler, Musik, Kontakte etc.)
   - Prompt: Welche Gefühle oder Gedanken haben sie wenn sie türkische Kultur erfahren?
   - Prompt: Wieso fühlen/denken sie so?

3. Aus ihrer persönlichen Erfahrung und Sichtweise: Was sind die wichtigsten Faktoren die Ihr Türkeibild beeinflussen? (z.B. eigene Kontaktpunkte, Medien, generelle Gefühle etc.)
   - Prompt: Wie beeinflussen sie sie?

4. Denken sie, dass man die EU bzw. die Türkei zu bestimmten Kulturräumen zuordnen kann?

5. Finden sie, dass Geschichte auch ein entscheidender Faktor sein wollte, unter dem ein türkischer Beitritt beurteilt werden sollte? Wenn ja/nein, inwiefern?

6. Von einer breiteren Perspektive aus gesehen: Gibt es aus ihrer sich Unterschiede zwischen der türkischen Kultur und der in den EU-Staaten? Wenn ja, inwiefern?
- Prompt: ... Familienleben?
- Prompt: ... Kunst?
- Prompt: ... Bildung?
- Prompt: ... Sprache?
- Prompt: ... bestimmte Traditionen?
- Prompt: ... Geschlechterrollen?
- Prompt: ... Privatsspähre?
- Prompt: ... Mentalität? (Charakteristiken wie z.B. traditionell oder progressiv, nationalistisch oder liberal, offen oder geschlossen etc.)
- Prompt: ... soziale Errungenschaften oder Fähigkeiten (e.g. Wissenschaft, Gesellschaftssystem, Entwicklung etc.)

7. Was sagen sie zur Befürchtung, dass ein türkischer EU-Beitritt die Identität der Europäischen Union bedrohen könnte?

8. Spielt aus ihrer Sicht Religion eine Rolle in ihrer Sichtweise eines möglichen Türkeibeitritts?

9. Welche Unterschiede oder Gemeinsamkeiten sehen sie hinsichtlich gesellschaftlichen Werten bzw. Maßstäben zwischen der EU und der Türkei?
   - Prompt: Wie wichtig sind diese?
   - Prompt: Wieso sind diese wichtig?

10. Gibt es zusätzliche, noch nicht genannte kulturelle Themen die für einen türkischen EU-Beitritt eine Rolle spielen?
   - Prompt: Wenn ja, können sie diese erläutern?

11. Hat die Türkei zur europäischen Kultur beigetragen? (z.B. Entwicklung)
   - Prompt: Wie könnte sie als Mitgliedsstaat zur europäischen Kultur positiv beitragen?

10.5. Transcription Referencing

The referencing of the interview transcripts for each paragraph was done as follows:

number of interview + number of question + first letter of respondents name

Example:

5.2.K. I think that there are countries in the EU, that can be compared in terms of patriotism. Look at England or France, there is also a strong patriotism. It is nothing bad or unusual.

= interview 5 + question 2 + respondent K

Interviews 1 to 3 (pilot study)
Interviews 4 to 6 (focus groups)
For all references in the text the respective line numbers are given, e.g. 5.2.K./98